Abstract-Conventional cryptography methods alone are not adequate for secure routing in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). These networks are more vulnerable to security attacks due to their diverse applications, lack of supervision and limitations in view of resource, processing and storage. To mitigate these problems, trust is widely used as a tool to provide better security by aiding routing protocols. In recent years, numerous researchers have proposed wide variety of solutions based on trust. However, all these solutions carry their own design. In this paper, we attempt to present steps for a systematic design of trust management systems for WSNs. In addition, we address the techniques followed by scholars in implementing trust frameworks. Furthermore, we provide discussion on state-of-the-art research in designing trust systems with summary and comparisons.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are cost effective solutions to various applications ranging from domestic appliances to war fields [1] . These networks consist of autonomous sensing and communication units called sensor nodes (or simply nodes) with limited processing capacity, energy and resource. WSNs are purely application specific and normally left unattended in a geographical region. These limitations often lead to exposed vulnerabilities and more prone to security attacks. Historically, security issues in WSNs have been studied by several researchers. However, it still remains a challenging problem. Though traditional cryptography techniques and cross layer encryption techniques are more powerful in providing security, they can mitigate only insider attacks thereby not suitable in all situations. In order to bypass the compromised or malicious nodes, a multidisciplinary concept called Trust Management has been studied by several researchers. Trust has become a significant aid in routing, data aggregation and intrusion detection. However, there exist several reviews and surveys which attempt to study common parameters among different trust models [2] .
In [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , surveys have been presented on trust management and security attacks along with their classifications. Several authors have proposed trust management schemes which have their own design considerations [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] . Lack of unity in design of existing schemes becomes cumbersome to understand and implement trust systems. In this paper, we attempt to present a systematic design of trust management so that a system developer can implement system specifications effectively. In addition, we discuss state-of-the-art trust management frameworks for secure routing, data aggregation and intrusion detection.
In the proposed design, every node will maintain an agent, which is responsible for application layer, communication layer and trust management. This model sits between the application and communication layer of protocol stack. This model is designed to suit a wide variety of trust models and applications. Broadly, our design (figure 1) is classified into four major blocks: trust producer, trust manager, external manager, and trust consumer. Trust producer produces trust value based on the inputs received from the trust manager. Trust manager will share the produced trust value with external manager and trust consumer. External manager will take care of the authentication schemes such as identity verification and mobility related issues. Trust consumer consists of three sub blocks: reputation manager, path manager and application manager. These three sub blocks utilize the generated trust value to support a wide variety of applications. We explain these blocks in section V, after presenting the literature review. This design is proposed only by considering references provided in this article.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after discussing background and preliminaries in section 2, section 3 presents various trust models used in the literature. Section 4 presents review on state-of-the-art trust management applications and section 5 describe our proposed design in support of presented literature. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 6.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section by providing background and preliminaries we discuss the need for security in WSNs followed by terminologies used in trust management.
There are two classes of wireless networks; Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). MANETs are cost effective solutions to wireless networks, having ad hoc deployment, rich in energy, processing and communication while compared to WSNs. WSNs has similar characteristics and operating features like MANETs. For example, sensor nodes are deployed in ad hoc fashion or dropped from a helicopter in a war field, thereby topology is unknown. Each node needs to sense the environment, identify their neighbors and forward data to the destination (base station). Because of the similarities, trust management frameworks developed for MANETS are used for WSNs with little modifications.
Basically, the communication can be guaranteed only with positive cooperation among nodes. In general, nodes in WSNs are application specific and designed with several constraints related to energy, processing and computation and will work with localized decisions. Due to application specific nature, and design limitations, WSNs are more prone to security attacks at various levels of protocol stack. Traditional cryptography schemes have gained popularity in securing communication; they have proved to be significant in identifying insider attacks. In addition, these algorithms carry extensive computation and usually require thousands or millions of multiplication and addition operations to execute a single security operation [9] . Hence, these are not suitable for resource constrained WSNs. So, there is a need to improve security while maintaining low resource consumption.
Research in the field of MANETs has shown that quality of service (QoS) is gradually affected when malicious nodes present in the network. It turned the attention of researchers to adopt a human behavior pattern called trust. Similarities of MANETs with WSNs lead to inherit trust models to work with WSNs. Basically; trust is an abstract concept, based on which several definitions are available in the literature. The concept of trust is used in many fields like psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, and computer science related fields such as e-commerce, social networks etc [6] . This concept has significantly gained attention in the field of communication to incorporate security. However, trust is used to define the degree of belief about the behavior of a particular entity. The trust calculation and establishment is carried out in association with routing protocols. While performing routing, every node maintains a trust manager to make routing decisions and to predict the behavior of neighboring nodes. This helps in mitigating the potential risks such as dead or ambiguous paths and security threats. The trust value can be useful to circulate a warning or alarm message among friend nodes about malicious nodes. In case if the trust value is completely low the node will be isolated from the network.
Trust can be expressed as 7-tuple {a, b, l, s, c, k,t} [12] . Where, a and b are two agents. These two agents can have a trust level l on a particular service s in a context c. This trust level is formed based on the degree of knowledge k about service offered at time t. The degree of knowledge can be obtained from the sets D, R, and G. Where, D is set of direct observations {d 1 , d 2 ,..,d n }, R is a set of recommendations {r 1 , r 2 ,,r n } , and G is a set of gossip values {g 1 , g 2 ,.,g n }. Due to page limit, detailed discussion on trust definitions and security attacks are not covered in this article. Interested readers can find them in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [16] [18] [20, 21] .
A node can obtain subjective observations about its neighbors [14] [22] . In case, if a node calculates how much it trusts another node in a subjective manner then it is said to be direct trust. Whenever trust management is incorporated in routing, each node needs to observe neighboring nodes and predict the reputation by collecting evidences regarding behavior in discharging duties such as cooperation and integrity maintained in packet forwarding, energy depletion, distance measurement etc. Trust of a node will be improved whenever it exhibits positive behavior or other nodes have positive experiences with it. However, these direct observations may become cumbersome whenever a malicious node responds to every query with out performing the required operation. In this case, two nodes may gossip trust information about third node so that all three nodes indirectly come to know about each other trust information. This is said to be indirect trust. In addition to these two ways, nodes can obtain recommendations from the trusted third parties such as base station or relay nodes or cluster heads. Hence, a node can obtain trust information either directly by first hand, indirectly by second hand in distributed fashion or by receiving recommendations from trusted third parties in a centralized or hierarchical fashion.
In the literature, there exists several keywords which are used interchangeably with trust. These are trustworthiness, belief, reputation, confidence etc. However, they have clear differences. Belief is the probability of a node that decides the level of trust. For example, 0 indicates complete distrust and 1 indicates complete trust. In some cases, a node A may or may not have belief probability to the actual trust level of another node B. It means that trust of node A on node B is not up to the trustworthiness of node B. Hence, the expected probability of belief is trust and actual probability is said to be trustworthiness. Miscalculation of trust and trustworthiness difference will leave scope for poor risk estimation over vulnerabilities. In some cases, trust management alone is not sufficient in all operations, however, risk, quality of service and trust need to be dealt separately before they are included in the trust computation. For example, high priority transactions fail to execute even though higher resources (such as bandwidth) are allocated in a low trusted environment. So, higher the trust lower is the risk and vice-versa. In other words, trust management is a form of risk management [24] [25] .
Trust has several properties. First, trust is not static; it is dynamic. Trust will be improved if any positive experiences take place and decreases in opposite case. So, trust changes over time and type of transaction experienced. Second, trust is asymmetric which means two nodes may not have same trust on each other. Third, trust is context dependent. The degree of trust will be based on context and application involved. Fourth, trust is subjective. It has a quantitative level or degree of belief over other nodes. Finally, trust is not transitive which means let " → " is trust and A, B and C are three nodes, if
During early stage of network (i.e. after node placement and bootstrapping) each node exhibits positive behavior and cooperation. Security threats, vulnerabilities and attacks can be expected as the network operations progress. A major issue to be considered in this context is how to bootstrap trust. From the time of node bootstrapping, trust values can be gathered by nodes self experiences, direct observations (one hop neighbors), observations in coalition with neighbor nodes (multi hop) and by authenticating identity or certificates for every significant transaction [42] .
III. TRUST MODELS
In this section, we discuss various trust models used by researchers to estimate trust and take action against malicious nodes.
A. Arithmetic/Weighted mean trust model
A generic method to calculate trust by multiplying direct and indirect trust is proposed in [13] . This method considers 
is a time dependent function and σ k is the number of successful observations. Each positive observation is assigned value 1 and negative observation is assigned value -1. F t gives higher relevance to the observed values of σ k . Indirect reputation will be calculated in similar way by collecting information from friend nodes. Finally, total reputation is calculated as
Where, W k is weight associated with service s k . Trust concept has been included with Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (T-GPSR) in [44] . T-GPSR considers two service criteria: number of packets forwarded (P f ) and number of packets forwarded without tampering (P wt ). The trust of a node is calculated as Trust(node i ) = (W (P f ) * P f +W (P wt ) * P wt ). Where, W (P f ) and W (P wt ) are weights associated for two services. In [45] , weight is associated to packet and agent. An agent can forward the packet only if it has trust value greater than trust associated with packet. A Similar work can be found in [47] .
B. Social Networks model
A trust model based on social networks is proposed in [34] . It has four components: monitoring system, reputation system, trust manager and path manager. Monitoring component asses the trust based on fairness in cooperation of nodes with network dynamics. In this method incentive based technique is introduced. Incentives will be provided to well behaving nodes. Punishment will be given to bad behaving nodes ranging from raising warning message to complete isolation of node. Node behavior is assessed by monitoring surrounding nodes for cooperation in routing and forwarding of packets. With the observed trust, path manager announces a best path to bypass malicious nodes. Each node enters the system with low trust which increases based on its positive behavior.
C. Bayesian Theory
The behavior of nodes is unpredictable or uncertain in the network dynamics. To predict the behavior, Bayesian theory makes use of prior probability of events and is later updated in the light of collected or available evidence. So, it is best suitable where uncertainty is present in node behavior. In [15] , a beta reputation system is developed by using beta probability density function (PDF). It models posterior reputation value by taking binary ratings as input. For a positive experience rating will be 1 and for a negative experience rating will be 0. Reputation score is the expectation value of beta PDF. A beta PDF denoted by beta(p|α, β ) and can be expressed by using gamma function (Γ). It is expressed as
Where, p is probability variable and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α, β > 0. The function is with restriction that the probability variable p = 0 if α < 1 and p = 1 if β < 1. Expectation is given by E(p) = α/(α + β ). And α, β are ratings of r positive and s negative outcomes with α = r +1 and β = s+1. A quantitative trust establishment framework proposed in [42] makes use of this method.
D. Subjective Logic
Josang et.al [19] have proposed a trust model based on subjective logic for electronic commerce applications. Subjective logic opinion is denoted by opinion function w. An opinion is a quadruple where the components respectively correspond to
The relative atomicity (a) is used for computing the expected opinion as Beta distribution with subjective logic is used to evaluate opinion. The expectation value is given by E(p) = a/(a + b). Where, a = (2b/u + 2a) and b = (2d/u + s (1 − a) ). Works based on this model can be found in [36] [43] .
E. Fuzzy Logic Model
A fuzzy rule based inference consists of three steps. First, calculating degree to which the input and conditions of fuzzy rules are matched. Second, calculating fuzzy rule based on its matching degree. Third, combining the inferences in support of all fuzzy rules into final decision. A trust model based on fuzzy logic is proposed in [26] . With T and U values, evaluation level of a node i is calculated as E(node i ) = T /(T + U). There exists several works based on fuzzy logic in [27] .
F. Game Theory model
With Game Theory [39] , one's individual success can be assessed based on behavior of others in a strategic situation. Two approaches are followed in this method: cooperative and non-cooperative games. In cooperative game, personal experiences and recommendations from trusted nodes are the source for information. The information is verified and finalized by conducting voting. The draw back of this scheme is that information collection and its validation via voting consumes network resources such as bandwidth. Where, in non-cooperative game, only personal experiences based on direct observation are considered as source of information by not allowing recommendations. Every node enters the network with an average trust and its trust value increases and decreases based on behavior. The Game theory works fine when game is bidirectional. However, sensor nodes in WSNs process one way transmission. Hence, this model cannot be aptly adapted to WSNs.
G. Meta Heuristic Methods
In addition to existing methods, bio-inspired methods are adopted by researchers to improve the security. Ant based adaptive trust model, a bio-inspired model based on swarm intelligence is proposed in [30] . It is a reactive evidence distribution scheme. An attractive feature of swarm intelligence is indirect communication through environment. Ants going through a path deposit a chemical called pheromone. This chemical expires over time. Any ant following the same path deposit new concentration of pheromone in place of old concentration. Ants attracts to the pheromone and follow high concentration pheromone path. In [30] , Swarm intelligence is used to distribute trust certificates in distributed and mobile environment.
H. Markov chain model
In a multicast MANET environment, to evaluate trust the Markov chain analysis is used in [51] . This approach has two steps: evaluating trust value and distributing trust certificates for key management. Trust value is evaluated based on Markov chain analysis in which each one hop neighbor trust value is assessed based on their previous trust performance. The estimated trust value is distributed among all nodes. Among the trust values, highest trust value node will be selected as certification authority for key management.
IV. TRUST MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS
In this section, applications supported by trust management are discussed. Trust concept is widely used in applications such as access control, key management, secure routing, data aggregation, and intrusion detection. [35] : This framework is a universal and reusable platform used to develop applications, products and solutions. A robust, energy aware and trust aware routing framework for dynamic WSNs is proposed in [35] . This framework effectively deals with energy and trust. It works with loose time synchronization, geographic information and effectively deals with harmful routing attacks such as selective forwarding, wormhole, sink hole and sybil attacks. Energy watcher and Trust manager are the two main components in TARF. Energy watcher keeps track of one hop delivery by a node along with energy cost (E) incurred. Where, EN b is the average energy cost for delivering a data packet from node N to its neighbor b with one hop. Selection of neighboring node b is based on the trust value in two cases, i.e, with routing loops and with delivery ratio. TARF is plugged with Collection Tree Routing Protocol (CTP) [55] which is an efficient, robust and reliable protocol for highly dynamic link topology. TARF effectively deals with wormhole and sinkhole attacks, however, it needs to be extended to deal with other routing attacks such as attacks on energy. [41] : A reputation based trust scheme with location based routing is proposed in ATSR [41] . ATSR is a scalable geographical routing approach with low complexity and is adopted to cope with large network dimensions. It makes use of direct and indirect trust to detect and avoid malicious node activity. In addition, energy awareness is introduced by simple weighted routing cost functions. Cost calculation is performed with localized decisions, there by complex path calculations are avoided and energy consumption requirements are considered with topology maintenance. Let x and y are two nodes, node x is confident of trust value it has calculated for node y only if it has performed an adequate number of interactions with node y. Each sensor node in the network maintains a trust repository to store trust information per neighbor and trust metrics. The trust metrics to be monitored in the direct trust are packet forwarding, network layer acknowledgment, packet precision, node authentication and confidentiality, reputation response, reputation validation and remaining energy. Indirect trust value is calculated in case of newly initialized nodes or newly appeared nodes (in case of mobility). To calculate indirect trust, source node randomly selects on node per quadrant so that only four unicast reputation requests and four unicast reputation responses are generated. This overcomes the drawback of broadcast messages. Reputation calculation takes place in the indirect trust to assess the confidence of newly initialized nodes or newly arrived nodes. In ATSR, routing decisions are based on localized information. The packets are forwarded to a node with three factors: highly trusted, as close to destination as possible and remaining energy. ATSR is a protocol designed to efficiently detect attacks like blackhole, gray-hole, colluding, unexpected modification, selfish behavior, bad-mouthing, conflicting behavior, sybil and traffic analysis attacks.
A. Secure Routing 1) TARF: Trust Aware Routing Framework

2) A Trust Aware Geographic Routing Scheme (ATSR)
3) HATWA: Heuristic Approach based Trust
Worthy Architecture [37] : A Heuristic Approach based Trust Worthy Architecture for WSN (HATWA) is proposed in [37] . HATWA considers the challenges of the trust system and focuses on collaborative mechanism for trust evaluation and maintenance. This architecture is capable of fulfilling security, reliability, mobility and performance requirements for reliable communication while being readily adaptable to different applications. Only few trust management schemes such as GTMS [49] Group based Trust Management Scheme discuss about mobility. HATWA works well in terms of communication overhead, memory requirements and energy consumption than GTMS. HATWA consists of three models: security, mobility and reliability. The trust value of a node security model will be high when it has secure routing protocol, access control and encryption of the routed packets. In mobility model, localization issue helps to locate the nodes in the terrain. Mobility of the node can be estimated based on the destination and source node location. The process of data fusion, negligible packet loss, low delay and the optimum energy consumption during transmission and reception of packets leads to reliable communication. The trust value in the network is represented as a continuous variable which runs over a specific range 1 to +1. HATWA works in four stages. In the first stage trust value is calculated based on the fault tolerant management mechanism. In second stage, a secure routing protocol is selected. In stage three, trust calculation is performed with mobility concerns. Finally in fourth stage, energy / power management included for power and energy requirements for HATWA.
In [46] , trust based cluster head selection is proposed in hierarchical routing. Some other related works for secure routing are [31] 
B. Data Aggregation
Larger the WSNs huge the redundancy in data. For example, in a temperature monitoring application, sensor nodes in a region will sense and report almost same readings to base station even though one reading is sufficient. It leads to energy depletion, lower network life time, and disconnection of network. To overcome this, an aggregated data in terms of average, count, maximum, minimum, median, most frequent samples, most uniform samples etc., can be reported. This procedure is said to be data aggregation. In [36] , a framework is proposed for data aggregation and fault tolerance to enhance the correctness and trustworthiness of collected information in wireless multimedia sensor networks. This is developed by extracting statistical characteristics from different sources and extending Josang [19] trust model (trust transfer and trust combination). This framework can evaluate discrete and continuous data streams through uniform mechanisms. The entire sensor networks system is classified into layers (level 1, 2, 3..n). Each level consists of sensor nodes grouped into clusters. Each cluster consists of cluster head, which is responsible for data aggregation and forwards data to the aggregation in the higher level. This process is carried out recursively up to base station. Each sensor node calculates self trust worthiness of collected data by a procedure called Memory Depth, (it is defined as the number of stored historical data which represents the temporal correlation). If the memory depth is zero, the node self data trustworthiness is one. Aggregation determines the trustworthiness of aggregated result by spatial correlation among sensor nodes in an aggregation set and aggregation breadth. Aggregation breadth is the number of children taking part in data aggregation. Sink node receives the aggregated results from the lower level aggregation, fuses them to obtain the final report, and determines the resulting trustworthiness.
Some other works related to data aggregation can be found in [32] .
C. Intrusion Detection
An iterative algorithm for trust management and adversary detection for delay-tolerant networks is proposed in ITRM [38] . Delay-tolerant networking (DTN) is an approach to computer network architecture that seeks to address the technical issues in heterogeneous networks that may lack continuous network connectivity. Examples of such networks are those operating in mobile or extreme terrestrial environments, or planned networks in space. Vehicular, planetary/interplanetary, military/tactical, disaster response, underwater and satellite networks are some examples of DTN. This work Proposes a graph based iterative algorithm inspired by success of message passing techniques for decoding low density parity check codes over bipartite graphs. ITRM effectively deals with DTNs with sparseness. ITRM effectively detects the malicious nodes even in the presence of attacks on the trust and detection mechanisms. ITRM proves more effective than the Bayesian framework.
A statistical technique called sequential hypothesis testing used to detect suspect regions is proposed in ZoneTrust [39] . In statistics, sequential analysis or sequential hypothesis testing is used for analysis where the sample size is not fixed in advance. Instead data are evaluated as they are collected, and further sampling is stopped in accordance with a predefined stopping rule as soon as significant results are observed. Thus a conclusion may sometimes be reached at a much earlier stage than would be possible with more classical hypothesis testing or estimation, at consequently lower financial and/or human cost. ZoneTrust detects even substantial fraction of nodes while reducing false positive and false negative rates. This detection technique is modeled using game theoretic analysis. Optimal strategies are defined for attacker and defender. ZoneTurst proves that node compromise is greatly limited by defender if attacker and defender follow optimal strategies.
A hierarchical dynamic trust management protocol for clustered heterogeneous wireless sensor networks is proposed in [40] . In this, a two layer trust management technique is proposed to effectively deal with selfish or malicious nodes and combined quality of service (Qos) metrics and social trust derived from social networks to achieve optimal values. This method is shown best in both detection and false positive probability than conventional anomaly based intrusion detection techniques.
Related works on intrusion detection can be found in [50] [52] . Comparison of trust management frameworks with respect to application type, topology, network type, security attacks consideration, scalability and trust observations are provided in table 1.
V. TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we explain systematic design of trust management system (figure 1). It is clear that each node should be social aware rather than transaction aware to estimate trust value of neighboring nodes. Each sensor node consists of five layers in protocol stack. Layers above the networks layers are responsible for processing security applications. So, in this design it is assumed that every node maintains an agent which is responsible for application layer and communication middleware. This design sits between application and communication middle ware. To be aware of the services processed by neighbor nodes, each node needs to be in promiscuous mode. During this mode medium access of data link layer will not respond to any requests it receives. However, a node can receive all packets passing through its radio range.
Proposed trust management design consists of four sub blocks: trust producer, trust manager, trust consumer and external manager. Communication between all four blocks is bidirectional. Trust manager is central authority of all blocks and responsible for initiating trust composing. It is observed from previous sections that based on requirements of application, information collection is initiated. Information is gathered based on the observation such as traffic flows, packet forwarding, communication path, energy of node, node cooperation and packet dropping. Depending on application requirements weights can be assigned for the observations. All observations collected by data collector are classified as direct, indirect or recommendation. By using collected data, trust models are applied to estimate the trust or reputation value. Generated trust values are carefully recorded by record keeper to create friend lists, trust and reputation records. Generated records are stored along with time stamp so that historical observations will help in judging suitable actions. A thread of trust producer associates continuously with trust manager so that trust records are periodically accessed with query processing sub system. In [17] , Geographic Hash Table  ( GHT) approach has been proposed to store trust values so that data operations are carried out with simple put() and get() functions. In [43] , an efficient, robust and scalable method is proposed to manage trust and decision making in unattended WSNs. This method use GHT to store trust values. In [23] , a query processing system is proposed to extract required trust values. In [34] , an alarm system is proposed to raise caution about malicious nodes. However, alarm is generally required if the trust value gradually decreases for certain period. It means that a node needs to have adequate interaction with the neighbor nodes. Alarm cannot be raised for low trust value with very few interactions. As the trust manager accesses the record storage periodically, caution alarm can be raised if any abnormalities are identified.
Frameworks [41] [45] consider reputation manager in association with trust manager. However, a certificate issued by accumulating trust value from surrounding nodes. Hence, trust is consumed by reputation. In case, trust value is decreased continuously over time it reflects reputation. So we assume reputation as consumer of trust. Reputation value is shared by path manager to make decision about route discovery or rearranging the path. Application support block can directly utilize the reputation without involvement of path manager. However, application like secure routing, key management need to work in coalition with path manager. Trust manager also responsible for external manager to make decisions for any external operations. External manager is responsible for mobility related issues. For example, during mobility, a node may discover new nodes or its previous neighbors can be absconded. In addition, each node needs to ensure safety and security before entering into the unknown regions. In some cases, nodes may not participate in communication due to energy depletion, node failure or propagation channel failure. Hence, trust models should support mobility module to take care of location, identity verification and channel failures. Moreover, this design can be customized based on the application requirement. It also helps system developer to explore patterns which are reusable for broad array of applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, systematic design of trust management system is presented with support of state-of-the-art trust systems design methods. It is an attempt to create a common nomenclature of trust management systems design. This design can be customized to use with application requirements. This model aims at trust composing by keeping in view of limitations of sensor nodes. In future, we attempt to differentiate all the models quantitatively so that suitable designs can be developed for ready made usage. Designing trust management frameworks based on taxonomy of routing algorithms and applications are also part of our future work.
